British combat ineffectiveness is more than offset by its chutzpah.

In a report made public over the weekend, Britain’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee chastised the US for “the absence of a unified vision and strategy” in conducting the war in Afghanistan. It warns of “considerable cultural indifference” by coalition partners (translation: Americans). And it blames the US for its use of UAV rocket attacks. It goes on to berate other NATO members for not contributing to the coalition effort. It blames everyone but the British themselves. Yet it is the British who have exhibited the lack of a unified strategy often by defying coalition policies and negotiating its own truces with the Taliban in its area of responsibility. In one case, after the truce had been signed, the Taliban quickly occupied a city that had been in coalition hands and subsequently the Taliban had to be removed by force. But worse than this duplicity is the deep seated defeatism of the senior British military leadership in Afghanistan that is the problem. It became so bad last October, US SecDef Gates found it necessary to give a blistering rebuttal of a newspaper interview given by the senior British commander. From the Telegraph (10/07/2008): “While we face significant challenges in Afghanistan, there certainly is no reason to be defeatist or to underestimate the opportunities to be successful in the long run,” Mr Gates said on board a military aircraft flying to Europe for Nato meetings. He was speaking in reaction to comments from Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, who said in a newspaper that the war against the Taliban could not be won, and the ambassador, Sherard Cowper-Coles, who said an "acceptable dictator" would be the best political solution for Afghanistan. Any US commander would be relieved on the spot for such a statement. This not the first time the British have exhibited such a shameful lack of backbone. In Iraq, they negotiated a truce with al Sadr’s Shia militias in Basra, ceding total control of the city to them. They moved their base of operations out of the city to a safer area near the airport. They simply took themselves out of combat. The Telegraph again reports (10/28/2007): Rather than fight on, they have struck a deal – or accommodation, as they describe it – with the Shia militias that dominate the city, promising to stay out in return for assurances that they will not be attacked. Since withdrawing, the British have not set foot in the city and even have to ask for permission if they want to skirt the edges to get to the Iranian border on the other side. When 6 months later, after Prime Minister Maliki had taken control of the Shia areas of Baghdad, he then set his sights on the militias in Basra in the British area of responsibility. Where were the British? They were no place to be found. So using what the press called an ill trained force, the Iraqi army took on the militias and cleaned house in three days. The militia thugs threw down their arms and people, for the first time in years, walked the streets without fear. There is no love lost between Maliki and the British. They had confined themselves to barracks and stayed out of the fray when they were needed most. If they had only the courage to simply pack their bags and leave, he might have respected them. So in December 2008, when it came time to set withdrawal deadlines under the UN mandate, he threw the insult back. Unlike the US forces which were given until the end of July 2010, roughly a year and a half to leave, the British were told to pack and be gone a year earlier, barely enough time to get all the equipment and men out. Yet after completing their humiliating departure last Friday, the British now have the gall to tell Americans we don’t know how to fight and win a war. But the latest pontifications from the Foreign Affairs Committee are no different from those espoused four years earlier by British Brigadier, Nigel Aylwin-Foster when he blasted the US counter insurgency strategy as overly harsh in an article in a British military journal. He even used similar terms such as “cultural ignorance” and “institutional racism.” As it turned out the British model failed in Iraq and the US succeeded. You don’t take a city like Fallujah by giving jelly beans to the kids. It takes going in, and staying, and living there, the Marine model. And, yes a lot of hard and dirty fighting too. Perhaps the British Ministry of Defense should concentrate on bigger and better jelly beans. The liberal politicians would love it, and also apparently the generals. But it won’t win wars. Update: One of the best recaps of the British failure in Iraq was put together by Greyhawk at The Mudville Gazette. From published articles, he traces the British involvement from the early days in April 2003 until the fall of Basra at the hands of the Iraqi Army. It is good read for history buffs and scholars. Read it here. Also, Richard North, publisher of the blog EU Referendum has written a book Ministry of Defeat 2003-2009. I haven’t read it yet, but his writings on his blog have been superlative.

Foreign policy … Failing grades for Obama and Hillary

Little was made of foreign policy achievements for the first 100 days by either Obama or the press. There is a reason. It is abysmal.

The five main areas of concern are North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. North Korea. After Kim launched his “satellite” which failed to achieve orbit, we took him to task at the UN. Even got the UN to pass sanctions on three companies involved in missile work, none of whom have we ever traded with. Kim threw a hissy fit and announced he would restart his plutonium producing reactor to make more weapons and refused to attend the Six Party talks, making them now, the Five Party talks. At our urging, Russia sent Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Pyongyang to smooth things out and got snubbed. At least he got 9,000 miles of perks from Aeroflot for the trip. Iran. No progress at all.

Ahmadinejad continues to snarl and threaten the dismantlement of Israel. There is no talk of resolving the nuclear stalemate. We have proposed talks to have talks to discuss it. The State Department is very good at that. The new Netanyahu government has turned the tables on the US which is pressuring it for a two state solution. Bebe has said he would be glad to talk about that, once Obama has succeeded in resolving Iran’s nuclear threat. Good hardballing Bebe.

Afghanistan. Obama’s personal diplomacy during his European trip resulted in a commitment for 5,000 troops to help in our efforts. Only problem, none of them are combat troops. All are trainers. Perhaps the French are worried Obama might beat them at their own game and bug out first. If only the French would send 900 military chefs instead, but alas mais non.

Iraq. Frictions are developing between Maliki and Hillary over making overtures to the Baathists who ran Saddam’s government. Maliki will have none of it. No kumbaya for him, he lost too many relatives. Something triggered the unusual public statement by Hillary, that “We are committed to Iraq.” Possibly it was all the talk of “date certain withdrawals” and “over the horizon redeployments” for the last few years that has Maliki on edge.

Pakistan. This is turning into a disaster. Remember they have about 5 dozen nuclear weapons floating around. Well Zardari felt the best way to solve the Taliban problem was to give them the Swat valley, sort of like what Neville Chamberlain did 70 years ago. But they got grabby and took neighboring Buner too about 60 miles away from the capital, Islamabad. Soon the world could be faced with a nuclear armed Taliban government in Pakistan. Scary!

Will Obama follow through on his pledge of August 2007? From the Washington Post:

…that as president he would be prepared to order U.S. troops into that country unilaterally if it failed to act on its own against Islamic extremists.

 No one thinks he will. And that’s the problem. No one knows what to expect of this inexperienced, naive administration.

Moving a carrier, what does it mean?

The Department of Defense announced on July 8, it is moving its only aircraft carrier in the region out of the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, to better conduct operations in Afghanistan. This fits with other information signaling a reduced emphasis on Iraq and the beginning of a drawdown troops added for the surge, scheduled to begin July 1. But there is potentially a more ominous side to it.

If hostilities against Iran were to begin, the last thing our Navy would want is to have a carrier trapped in the Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz can be easily mined preventing an exit, and floating mines (used effectively by Saddam in the first gulf war) would be an unacceptable hazard. “Sea room” is one of the best protective measures naval forces can use. It gives time to assess a threat and deal with it. Operating in the Gulf 60 to 80 miles from the Iranian coast just doesn't allow enough decision time against a high speed aircraft. This doesn’t mean anything is imminent, but it appears to be the Navy is exercising foresight.