Biden’s deceptive remarks on Iran’s nuclear weapons program

Vice President Joe Biden in last night’s debate said that while Iran may have the capability to enrich uranium, it does not have a warhead and does not present a threat.  There are problems with his statement.

The first is it is likely the Iranians have already designed and tested major components of a warhead using substitute (non-nuclear) materials.  This was done under the direction of a Ukrainian scientist who had formerly worked at the Soviet/Russian nuclear facility Chelyabinsk-70.  The November 2011 IAEA report places this test at the Parchin, Iran military base. The IAEA has repeatedly been denied access to inspect the building where he test reportedly took place.  Commercial satellite photography early in 2012 documents efforts to sanitize the area.  Here is the quote from the IAEA report:

47. One necessary step in a nuclear weapon development programme is determining whether a theoretical design of an implosion device, the behaviour of which can be studied through computer simulations, will work in practice. To that end, high explosive tests referred to as “hydrodynamic experiments” are conducted in which fissile and nuclear components may be replaced with surrogate materials.41

48. Information which the Agency has been provided by Member States, some of which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials such as tungsten. These components were said to have incorporated small central cavities suitable for the insertion of capsules such as those described in Section C.9 below. The end use of such components remains unclear, although they can be linked to other information received by the Agency concerning experiments involving the use of high speed diagnostic equipment, including flash X ray, to monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core of a nuclear device.

49. Other information which the Agency has been provided by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The explosives vessel, or chamber, is said to have been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was constructed at that time around a large cylindrical object at a location at the Parchin military complex. A large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighbouring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The Agency has obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information. From independent evidence, including a publication by the foreign expert referred to in paragraph 44 above, the Agency has been able to confirm the date of construction of the cylinder and some of its design features (such as its dimensions), and that it was designed to contain the detonation of up to 70 kilograms of high explosives, which would be suitable for carrying out the type of experiments described in paragraph 43 above.

It may be that Biden is simply parsing words to convey a falsehood.  When he says Iran doesn’t have a warhead, he may be technically correct because they haven’t yet enriched the uranium to weapons grade (80 to 90%).  A warhead without the fissile fuel is not a warhead.  But if the remaining components are tested and ready, all that needs to be done is fabricate the two hemispheric shells of U-235 and assemble them into the warhead.

The other thing Biden misses is there is only a limited time of vulnerability for an attack to succeed.  Once the centrifuges have enriched the gaseous uranium hexafluoride to the weapons grade and it has been converted to metallic form, it can be hidden almost anywhere.  Only during the enrichment process, do we know here it is – most likely at Fodor, but possibly at Natanz.  Both are underground enrichment facilities. 

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has a much firmer grasp of the realities.  The red line he refers to is when enrichment begins above the 20% level, warhead or no warhead. 

The coming conflict with Iran … Part 2, The refusal to allow IAEA inspectors into Parchin

This is the second of several installments on Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.  The first is here.

Subject: Parchin Military Complex

Coordinates:   35° 31.915'N      51° 45.116'E

The Parchin Military Complex has been in the news lately because for the second time since the beginning the year, Iran has refused to allow IAEA inspectors to go there.  Parchin is important because the IAEA and intelligence agencies of several nations have evidence that it was used to conduct tests of a dummy implosion device.  These tests are important because they measure the accuracy and the degree of compression of the nuclear “pit”, the hollow spherical shell of fissionable material that is compressed to create a nuclear detonation.  These tests use non fissionable material to simulate “assembly” or compression of the fissile material.  Flash X-rays are used to measure the symmetry and compression.  Click here to see an actual experiment using flash X-rays from the 1944-1945 era.  There is no legitimate peaceful use for this technology. 

The November 2011 IAEA report is a damning indictment of Iran’s efforts to pursue and hide its nuclear weapons program.  It is long and dry and technical and written in soft sounding diplomatic legalese.  But it makes its point.  Download it and read it if you are serious about understanding what is happening.  On the Parchin problem it states:

47. One necessary step in a nuclear weapon development programme is determining whether a theoretical design of an implosion device, the behaviour of which can be studied through computer simulations, will work in practice. To that end, high explosive tests referred to as “hydrodynamic experiments” are conducted in which fissile and nuclear components may be replaced with surrogate materials.41

48. Information which the Agency has been provided by Member States, some of which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials such as tungsten. These components were said to have incorporated small central cavities suitable for the insertion of capsules such as those described in Section C.9 below. The end use of such components remains unclear, although they can be linked to other information received by the Agency concerning experiments involving the use of high speed diagnostic equipment, including flash X ray, to monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core of a nuclear device.

49. Other information which the Agency has been provided by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The explosives vessel, or chamber, is said to have been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was constructed at that time around a large cylindrical object at a location at the Parchin military complex. A large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighbouring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The Agency has obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information. From independent evidence, including a publication by the foreign expert referred to in paragraph 44 above, the Agency has been able to confirm the date of construction of the cylinder and some of its design features (such as its dimensions), and that it was designed to contain the detonation of up to 70 kilograms of high explosives, which would be suitable for carrying out the type of experiments described in paragraph 43 above.

It appears this is the IAEA’s the final step to officially declare Iran out of compliance with Non Proliferation Treaty they signed.  And that will clear the way for further sanctions or actions by member nations.  This is the end of line for diplomacy other than some “peace missions” by willing fools.  Don’t count Jimmy Carter out.  After all he’s the one who got us into this mess in the first place

The coming conflict with Iran … Part 1, Mysterious explosions near Teheran

Island Turtle will cover Iran’s nuclear and missile development programs in several installments.  It will present information and satellite imagery about Iran’s missile manufacturing facilities, test areas and nuclear development sites.  It will show an underground site, part of a vast military storage area, built into a side of a mountain that has yet to be reported by the media.  It will also report on mysterious explosions and offer guidance on what happened and who is likely behind it.  You will be surprised.  The intent is to help Turtle readers follow news events in Iran intelligently when and if they happen, with locations, coordinates and background facts. 

Subject:  Explosion at Shahab-3 missile site November 12, 2011

On Saturday November 12, in the middle of the day Teheran was shaken by two massive explosions, followed by smaller ones.  Western press reports said windows were broken in Teheran from the blasts 28 miles (45 km) away, near Malard. The first report had 27 killed, including Revolutionary Guard’s Major General Hassan Moghadam, the head of Iran’s missile programs.  Later ones lowered that to 17 Guards, including General Moghadam.  There was speculation from Israeli sources that 10 North Koreans died also, though that was never confirmed.  The Iranian state controlled press initially blamed it on an accident of transferring munitions at an ammunition storage area.  Eventually that changed to two Guard run military facilities several kilometers apart that had accidental explosions.  Press speculation, especially in Israel, claimed it was foreign sabotage.  Neither is correct.

On November 28, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published satellite imagery from Digital Globe taken on November 22, 10 days after the blasts.  It showed utter devastation of the complex.  Every building suffered major damage and one simply ceased to exist.  What is most significant is there is no large crater.  That would be expected from such and explosion. The photography shows the damage came from a massive overpressure and also many small but well placed explosions.  It could not come from sabotage or an accident.  It was too widespread.  It could only have come from the air.

The production site in the Digital Globe/ISIS imagery is one of three facilities west of Malard that are involved with Iran’s missile program, most importantly the solid fuel Shahab-3, medium range missile (range 1200 miles, 2000 km).  The three facilities are within 3 miles (5 km) of each other.

Hq and R&D Facility              35° 39.088'N   50° 52.280'E   Probably also hit

Assembly & Propellant          35° 37.450'N   50° 52.422'E   Destroyed Nov. 12, 2011
Static Test area                         35° 36.464'N   50° 52.354'E

The sites have been in existence at least since 2003, but there was an accelerated effort to upgrade them, especially the assembly site, beginning in late 2009.  An unusual looking moveable building (on rails) was constructed to shelter the pits for loading solid fuel propellants.   And an enclosed tower was built, attached to an existing building that is resembles, on a smaller scale, NASA’s Space Shuttle Vertical Assembly Building.  It is most likely intended to align and calibrate the missile’s guidance systems in a vertical configuration.

What can we learn from the Digital Globe/USIS imagery?  First, the main problem is the quality of what they posted.   It is only 650x431 pixels, and that makes it difficult to do damage assessment of small structures.  But all is not lost.  Some things come through, especially if the sun angle gives good contrast or shadows.  The first impression is the breadth of the utter destruction.  The complex is just short of 300 yards in its widest dimension and every major building has significant damage.  As said earlier, roofs are simply flattened.  Building G is the classic example.  Normally you would see the shadow of the roof on the ground.  Here, it is the wall throwing the shadow, along with the row of windows that show through.  Buildings D and E show the same effect, only the walls have been turned into convoluted skeletons, stripped of their skins.  Such damage can only come from an airburst of a very large weapon.  

The other observation is the scorch marks, penetrations and small craters.  We see them in one form or another at most of the buildings that remain.  The pattern of these small explosions is awesome.  The two hits right along the centerline of building A attest to very accurate, well programmed guidance systems.  Different missile warheads have unique patterns of destruction.  The weapon most likely used here is the GBU-39 with the benign name of “Small Diameter Bomb” (SDB). It is a highly versatile weapon.  (Video here) It is a precision guided autonomous 250 pound weapon that carries a tiny 50 pound warhead.  It is designed to be highly lethal at close ranges while limiting collateral damage.  It does it by mixing ultra small pellets of tungsten into the explosive which when detonated, rapidly slow down from air drag.  It has wings that deploy when released and can glide for 60 nautical miles, making it a standoff weapon.  It can be fused for airburst, timed to detonate at a specified distance after impact or as an earth penetrator.  It was used by the Israelis in operation Cast Lead to collapse tunnels and buried weapons caches in Gaza.

Now the whodunit question.  Only two nations have the will and weaponry to pull this off, the US and Israel.  It is really a tossup but the edge goes to the US.  Here ‘s why:  Both nations have SDBs and both nations can make large bombs.  What the Israelis don’t have is ultra stealthy aircraft.  The F-22 Raptor is in a class by itself, so good we won’t sell it to our closest allies, Israel and Australia for security reasons.  And there is the heavy lifter,the B-2.  It  has been modified to carry two 35,000  pound weapons.  Nothing in Israel’s inventory can come close to that.

This was a raid conducted in broad daylight.  It was a “shock and awe” in your face strike designed to tell Iran’s mullahs you can be hit at any time, on any day and you can’t do anything about it.  Shock and awe is a trademark of the US Air Force.   Another tidbit that hints at US involvement – on December 1, just 19 days after the missile site explosions, and 3 days after similar series of explosions removed some buildings at a uranium processing site at Ishfahan Iran, President Obama made this statement to a group of Jewish contributors:

This administration – I try not to pat myself too much on the back – but this administration has done more in terms of the security of the state of Israel than any previous administration….

Was this just a coincidence?  You decide.

What’s going on in the Middle East? Is all hell about to break loose?

Two major clues came to light over this past weekend. The first was the unusual secret meeting of CIA Director Leon Panetta last Thursday (Jan. 28) with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and later Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The second was an administration leak to the press that we are beefing up missile defenses in the Gulf.

After months of Iran’s stalling, nuclear negotiations have gone nowhere. It was obvious from the start they would go nowhere. The self imposed deadline we made to keep Israel from unilaterally striking Iran came and went at the end of the year.

Someone now has to step to the plate, either the US or Israel. Likely it will be us. And the next move along with our allies (UK, the Gulf States and possibly France) will probably be to declare an embargo/blockade on gasoline and refined products into Iran. This job is made simpler because virtually all gasoline imported from outside the Gulf, funnels through a single port/pipeline terminal, Bandar Abbas, located just outside of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran, despite having gobs of oil, has very little refining capacity – a critical mistake by the ruling mullahs. Most of the imported gasoline comes from a transshipment port in the Emirates, Fujairah, a short 120 mile run to Bandar Abbas. This source will of course dry up, as the Emirates will be on board with us.

To handle the inevitable blockade runners, we must either intercept them or take the lower risk approach and mine the port. Mining is relatively simple to accomplish and most likely would be done with carrier aircraft operating from the Gulf of Oman. Mining has the advantage that you don’t have to actively sink a blockade runner. With mines, nothing goes bang unless the offending ship decides to challenge the minefield. The onus is on the ship owner and its captain. Unless a country has an effective mine sweeping capability, and the Iranians don’t, the port stays closed as happened to Haiphong in 1972.

Most air delivered mines are inexpensive “dumb” bombs with pressure, acoustic or magnetic “triggers.” They can be easily and quickly replenished as needed. There are even more sophisticated mines that are battery powered torpedoes that lay in wait and become active when it hears a ship approaching several miles away. The stand-off distance makes sweeping very difficult. What happens after we declare the embargo/blockade? Well, that’s when all hell breaks loose.

For starters Iran must make a choice whether or not to close the Straits of Hormuz. For them, the positive is they will cut off the 17 million barrels a day that keeps industry in the West humming. The negative is they will cut off all of their own oil exports. Likely they will mine the Straits anyway. The Middle East just works that way.

In Israel you will probably see Iran’s surrogates Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Hamas in Gaza try and make as much trouble as they can. The meeting of Panetta and Mubarak was to coordinate the isolation of Gaza and to share intelligence on smuggling efforts to resupply Hamas. Egypt recently built a fence on its side of the Gaza border which now means longer tunnels and more digging for the smugglers. In the North expect the same rocket attacks from Hezbollah in Lebanon you saw in 2006.

This time Israel will have a plan in place and retaliation will be in seconds rather than in minutes. In the US we will see oil shortages and likely some form of rationing, probably similar to what we saw in 1973-4. Maybe worse. And you wondered why Obama reversed course and called for more drilling in the State of the Union address. Now you know.

Ahmadinejad gives Obama the bird

Iran put an exclamation point on its message to the US that it’s not interested in having its reactor fuel reprocessed outside of its territory. Yesterday it announced it was going to try the three hapless Americans who stumbled into Iran, on spy charges. These idiot thrill seekers are now hostages who are being used for leverage against the US. And just like the embassy hotages in the Carter presidency, they are being used to humiliate Obama.

At the end of September, after months of negotiations, Iran agreed in principle to allow its research reactor fuel to be reprocessed outside of its borders. This is important from a non-proliferation standpoint because the country doing the reprocessing has control of the spent fuel byproducts, most importantly the nuclear explosive plutonium. But as the October deadline loomed, Iran first agreed to allow France and Russia to do it, then only Russia and eventually said no one could. That’s where it stands now.  The administration is desperately shopping around for another country such as Turkey without much luck so far. Iran is doing a typical stall, buying time while it continues its nuclear enrichment program.

This is the inevitable outcome when one side has talks as its prime goal, and the other just wants time. For Iran the price is cheap, just the expenditure of a lot of hot air. Obama should look back at the endless talks of the Carter years over our embassy hostages that invariably ended in frustration. At a certain point the US must say we have passed the deadlines, we are making no progress and we will take appropriate action. And still we haven’t even addressed Iran’s uranium enrichment program which should be our prime objective.

Don’t believe the NIE … Iran will have a weapon far sooner, by following the South African model.

Iran most likely will develop a nuclear capability far sooner than the NIE timeline of around 2015 . They will do it because they likely already have the technology and they are in a hurry to close the window of vulnerability from an attack by the West. All they need is sufficient weapons grade uranium.

Iran will probably take the South African approach, where 25 years ago they developed a lightweight gun type weapon for the similar reasons. South Africa needed a weapon soon, not later because of a perceived threat from Soviet backed Cuban forces in nearby Angola. Much of the analysis both classified and from think tanks, mistakenly presupposes Iran will only pursue an implosion device. That’s what most nations would do and are doing. But most nations have different aims; deterrence and massive retaliation if attacked. Numbers of weapons are important. Iran on the other hand is more into terror and nuclear blackmail. For Iran numbers are less important than a credible threat.

There are two roads to nuclear explosives; one, highly enriched uranium (U-235), the other - plutonium. Uranium is the most difficult road, requiring massive centrifuge plants that use large amounts of electricity to concentrate the fissionable isotope U-235 to weapons grade (80-93%). The plants are difficult to hide from prying eyes.

Plutonium on the other hand is naturally produced in power and research reactors and can be extracted easily from spent fuel by simple chemical precipitation. Covert extraction of plutonium is far easier to hide than enriching uranium. Iran is pursuing the more difficult uranium road. North Korea is going for plutonium.

And there are also two roads for weapons design. One is an implosion device (used at Nagasaki) or a gun type (Hiroshima) where two subcritical masses are literally shot into each other to form a critical mass and a nuclear explosion. The former is more efficient and produces a bigger bang. For these reasons, most in the nuclear club have developed only implosion devices. On the other hand, the less efficient gun type device can be developed faster and is easier to design with a very high assurance of success even without testing (the Hiroshima device was never tested before it was used). A limiting factor for gun type weapons is they can not use more easily obtained plutonium, only uranium. But this limitation doesn’t affect Iran, which has begun enriching uranium on a massive scale.

The South African Experience

In the mid 1970’s feeling threatened by Soviet/Cuban intervention in Africa, the South African government started down the road to becoming a nuclear power. Similar to Iran today, they settled on the production of uranium as the fuel and developed a gun type of weapon. Between 1982 and 1989 they completed 6 lightweight (750 kg/1,650 lb) weapons with an estimated yield of 10-18 kt. (Hiroshima was 15 kt.). A seventh was partially completed when the South African government voluntarily made the decision to give up its nuclear aspirations. The weapons were deliverable by either their Buccaneer jet fighter-bombers or locally produced ballistic missiles.

There are serious parallels between Iranian and South African programs. Both use(d) uranium, giving the ability to make either implosion or gun devices. Iran sees time as the enemy, prolonging its window of vulnerability. The question is not whether they will develop the simpler gun type weapon, but why wouldn’t they? They can have their cake and eat it too. While it takes about three times as much uranium for a gun weapon, around 5 years down the road when they have an operational implosion system, they can use the fissile fuel from the earlier weapons for three of the new. It’s win, win.

In addition you can’t ignore the knowledge sharing going on between Iran and North Korea in both nuclear and missile technology. Iranian scientists were present at both N. Korean nuclear tests and most of their missile technology is N. Korean. The Koreans are doing the heavy lifting on implosion devices, but they are stumbling. Their first test was essentially a fizzle (less than 1 kt) and the second most likely only around 4 kt. That shouldn’t give the Iranians a lot of confidence.

No, they will pursue the low tech gun approach for an interim weapon and surprise us.

Obama on courageous Iranian protestors … weak and vacillating

George Bush has been unequivocal in his support of freedom in Iran. Twice in his State of the Union addresses he spoke to the Iranian people. 

And to the Iranian people, I say tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you. --- State of the Union address February 2, 2005

And tonight, let me speak directly to the citizens of Iran: America respects you, and we respect your country. We respect your right to choose your own future and win your own freedom. And our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran. --- State of the Union address, January 31, 2006

Contrast that to Barack Obama’s tepid support.

I am deeply troubled by the violence that I’ve been seeing on television…. --- Obama, June 15, 2009

I'm very concerned based on some of the tenor -- and tone of the statements that have been made -- that the government of Iran recognize that the world is watching --- Obama, June 19, 2009

We call on the Iranian government to stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people…. --- Obama, June 20, 2009

Not exactly Ronald Reagan at the Berlin Wall. There are events in history when great leaders seize the moment. It was Hungary in 1956, Prague in 1968. It was Yeltsin standing atop a tank outside of the Blue House in Moscow. Obama seems more interested in keeping himself in Ahmadinejad’s good graces than standing on principle. He is letting the courageous people of Iran down. If Ahmadinejad wants to have talks with Obama, he will find a way. Criticism won’t queer the deal. It didn’t with Reagan and the Soviet leaders on arms talks. It seems Obama has established a mindset of realpolitik, accepting as legitimate any regime, no matter how brutal or corrupt. By playing up to the dictatorial leadership of Iran, he comes across as weak and vacillating.

Herschel Smith, writing in The Captain’s Journal hits the nail on the head on the misplaced mindset of the administration.

As Netanyahu was recently told by an American official, “We are going to change the world. Please, don’t interfere.” But as we are beginning to see, situations that contradict the world view don’t result in amending that world view. They simply stupefy the administration. Thus they stare in disbelief and silence as Iran goes up in flames.

Foreign policy … Failing grades for Obama and Hillary

Little was made of foreign policy achievements for the first 100 days by either Obama or the press. There is a reason. It is abysmal.

The five main areas of concern are North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. North Korea. After Kim launched his “satellite” which failed to achieve orbit, we took him to task at the UN. Even got the UN to pass sanctions on three companies involved in missile work, none of whom have we ever traded with. Kim threw a hissy fit and announced he would restart his plutonium producing reactor to make more weapons and refused to attend the Six Party talks, making them now, the Five Party talks. At our urging, Russia sent Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Pyongyang to smooth things out and got snubbed. At least he got 9,000 miles of perks from Aeroflot for the trip. Iran. No progress at all.

Ahmadinejad continues to snarl and threaten the dismantlement of Israel. There is no talk of resolving the nuclear stalemate. We have proposed talks to have talks to discuss it. The State Department is very good at that. The new Netanyahu government has turned the tables on the US which is pressuring it for a two state solution. Bebe has said he would be glad to talk about that, once Obama has succeeded in resolving Iran’s nuclear threat. Good hardballing Bebe.

Afghanistan. Obama’s personal diplomacy during his European trip resulted in a commitment for 5,000 troops to help in our efforts. Only problem, none of them are combat troops. All are trainers. Perhaps the French are worried Obama might beat them at their own game and bug out first. If only the French would send 900 military chefs instead, but alas mais non.

Iraq. Frictions are developing between Maliki and Hillary over making overtures to the Baathists who ran Saddam’s government. Maliki will have none of it. No kumbaya for him, he lost too many relatives. Something triggered the unusual public statement by Hillary, that “We are committed to Iraq.” Possibly it was all the talk of “date certain withdrawals” and “over the horizon redeployments” for the last few years that has Maliki on edge.

Pakistan. This is turning into a disaster. Remember they have about 5 dozen nuclear weapons floating around. Well Zardari felt the best way to solve the Taliban problem was to give them the Swat valley, sort of like what Neville Chamberlain did 70 years ago. But they got grabby and took neighboring Buner too about 60 miles away from the capital, Islamabad. Soon the world could be faced with a nuclear armed Taliban government in Pakistan. Scary!

Will Obama follow through on his pledge of August 2007? From the Washington Post:

…that as president he would be prepared to order U.S. troops into that country unilaterally if it failed to act on its own against Islamic extremists.

 No one thinks he will. And that’s the problem. No one knows what to expect of this inexperienced, naive administration.

Storm clouds

Another shoe has fallen in what appears to be US preparations for the contingency of an Israeli preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. According to Reuters the administration is poised to approve delivery of a Raytheon FBX-T radar system to Israel within 6 months. This mobile land based missile defense radar has a 2500 nautical mile range. It can detect baseball size objects at this range and incorporates advanced target discrimination technology to sort warheads from dummies and debris. The system allows far earlier engagement times than Israel’s Green Pine radar. This is important because the time of flight of a missile launched from Iran at Israel is only 11 minutes. Its data can be integrated into Israel’s Arrow anti-missile system as well as nearby ship borne US Navy SM-3 missiles. The latter was used to down an errant American satellite this past February. Reuters reports the imminent decision to deploy comes at the urging of a bipartisan group of congressmen.

“Nearly 70 members of Congress, including the top Democrat and Republican on the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, sent a letter to Bush this week urging him to offer a warning radar that is "fully integrated" with the emerging U.S. shield.”

An earlier sign of trouble brewing was the redeployment in early July of the Abraham Lincoln carrier task group outside of the Straits of Hormuz, instead of its normal stomping grounds in the Persian Gulf. This reduces its vulnerability of being trapped in the Gulf in the event of a conflict. It allows defensive sea room and the ability to maneuver.

Moving a carrier, what does it mean?

The Department of Defense announced on July 8, it is moving its only aircraft carrier in the region out of the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, to better conduct operations in Afghanistan. This fits with other information signaling a reduced emphasis on Iraq and the beginning of a drawdown troops added for the surge, scheduled to begin July 1. But there is potentially a more ominous side to it.

If hostilities against Iran were to begin, the last thing our Navy would want is to have a carrier trapped in the Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz can be easily mined preventing an exit, and floating mines (used effectively by Saddam in the first gulf war) would be an unacceptable hazard. “Sea room” is one of the best protective measures naval forces can use. It gives time to assess a threat and deal with it. Operating in the Gulf 60 to 80 miles from the Iranian coast just doesn't allow enough decision time against a high speed aircraft. This doesn’t mean anything is imminent, but it appears to be the Navy is exercising foresight.